International Journal on World Peace

Introduction to IJWP, June 2017

This issue of IJWP focuses on the prospects for democracy in the Middle East. The larger question behind this is whether democracy is the most desirable form of government for the Middle East, or for anywhere else in the world. In the March 2017 issue, Professor Gafurov argued that democracy is a stage in social development that is higher than rule by dictatorship, the most common form of government in the Middle East. In the mathematical model of social and political development that he described, societies require large segments of the population that are morally constructive (M) and economically self-sufficient (E), and that democracies require a large number of middle-class owners and a vibrant civil society. Democracies require people who largely do not rely on government for anything except freedom and security. The Middle East countries whose economies are based on the sale of oil, whose oil proceeds are distributed through the state, do not have large numbers of citizens who are economically independent from the state—an E deficit. The religion of Islam, to the extent it promotes ritual and obedience, rather than creative inquiry, would mean an M deficit. These factors argue against the possibility of achieving democracy in the Middle East any time soon.

Many people in the West would like to see democracy bloom in the Middle East, and the Arab Spring movements there that the West supported reveal that many individuals aspire to democracy, or at least the moral and economic independence they see in the West. However, if the Arab Spring taught the world one lesson, it was that giving a democratic vote to people unprepared for democracy is likely to make conditions worse than the dictatorship they experienced before a democratic revolution. Democratic evolution, as opposed to revolution, might be a more possible path to democracy, as evidenced by the developments in Tunisia that preceded the revolutionary Arab Spring fervor that resulted in disaster. This issue of IJWP contains two articles that examine this question. Continue reading →

Introduction to IJWP, December 2016

Table of Contents

In this issue of International Journal on World Peace, three articles probe the creation of peaceful and legitimate states. Since the rise of modern democracies, people have believed that having elections would make states legitimate because every citizen would have a right to participate in governance. Such simple views fail to ask whether (1) the governance system gives all groups access to power, or (2) whether people are capable of voting as responsible citizens.

The recent events related to the “Arab Spring” began with euphoria and largely ended in despair as violence, starvation, and millions of refugees were the product of what was intended to be a transition to better Arab societies. In some cases, the opposite results of what the Arab Spring promoted were created, for example the emergence of ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya filling the vacuum of failed states. This led many to conclude that arming rebel forces, or attempting to occupy a foreign country, was counterproductive and that the refugees were the result of the policies of the Bush and Obama administrations and their allies. Many American citizens began to side with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s view that the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad should have been supported and humanized by improving human rights, rather than by arming rebels to topple the regime and creating chaos.

How are regimes best transitioned? What might lead to transition failure? The first article, by Samuel R. Greene and Jennifer Jefferis, is titled “Overcoming Transition Mode: An Examination of Egypt and Tunisia.” It examines the popular idea that continuity with the previous regime will have better prospects for success than a complete break from the previous regime and uses Tunisia and Egypt as examples. Surprisingly, Egypt had greater continuity and more elections than Tunisia, but it failed to transition, whereas Tunisia, which created an interim government and a new constitution seems to have some chance of successfully transitioning. Continue reading →

Introduction to IJWP, June 2016

Table of Contents

One of the fundamental tensions in the contemporary world has been between traditional societies and modernity. “Traditional societies” refers to those who are connected to traditional communities or cultures. This includes accepting received religious beliefs and/or scriptures, loyalty to community leaders, and shaping one’s life based on how things were done in the past. “Modernist societies,” on the other hand, refers to those societies who have faith in science, modern social institutions like the bureaucratic state, and those who want to build a new and different future based on reason and discovery.

Social change is inevitable. There are demographic changes, technological changes, changes in the natural environment, and more. Traditional ethnic and national groups are constantly bumping up against one another, infringing on territory. Some groups suffer from environmental impacts made by other groups. New technologies and social institutions create lifestyle changes. Traditionalists are more likely to resist these changes, while modernists are more likely to advocate change. The tension between tradition and modernity can lead to constructive change and adaptation, but often it leads to civil war and strife. This depends on the people involved, and whether they are willing and able to adapt. Whether people have a traditionalist or a modernist orientation, they can act peacefully or violently based on the maturity of their social consciousness. Continue reading →

Introduction to IJWP, December 2015

The articles in this issue of IJWP are related to the cultural consciousness that influences group-on-group violence. The pursuit of group interest with disregard to the interests of other groups can either be the willful result of selfishness or actions based on ignorance of the situation of other groups.
The photos of the body of the three-year-old son of Syrian Abdullah Kurdi washed up on a Turkish beach helped fuel a campaign for global sympathy for refugees fleeing war-torn areas in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This sympathy increased pressure on states to receive more refugees and for reform of bureaucratic practices. Refugees make dangerous illegal trips in which the death rate is high because red tape can make legal immigrants wait for years. This news promoted by global media raised global consciousness of the plight of others who are suffering an undeserved fate, and helped to encourage compassion for members of other groups. The result was increased quotas for refugees adopted by many countries, although few solutions to solve the systemic violence causing the refugees to flee were promoted by the media. It is clear that the media and globalization have a major impact on the fate of people who a century ago would never have been known to the larger world. However, the media often promote elite interests that lead to group conflict. Continue reading →

Introduction to IJWP, June 2015

This issue of IJWP looks at the relationship of violence to what might be called “maturity of truth,” or personal and cultural wisdom. “Truth” is both individual and social. It is individual when it refers to a person’s attainment of an awareness of others as equally valuable and worthy of life in a shared world, and the knowledge and skills necessary to achieve a happy and fulfilling life through productive activities that do not harm others. Truth is social when it is embodied in civilization. By civilization, I mean a culture whose language, norms, institutions, and behavior patterns reflect a collective awareness of the worth of all human beings, human rights that apply to all people, and a level of knowledge and social organization that allows all people an equal opportunity to prosper.

The first article is an essay by sociologist Tom Kando that argues “Demography is Destiny,” a statement attributed to Auguste Comte, the father of sociology. In his analysis, Kando concludes that the single variable that correlates most with violence is age. Statistics show that more homicides per capita occur in places where the median age is lower. Further breaking it down, the most violence occurs where there are a high number of unemployed young males. This pattern occurs in data comparing countries where, for example, the homicide rate is higher in Venezuela with a median age of 25.8 than the United States with a median age of 36.9. It is even lower in Japan, where the median age is 44.6. This correlation also occurs within countries where, for example, the homicide rate is higher in Chicago, with a median age of 31.5, than in Plano, Texas, which has a median age of 38. Some commonly discussed factors, like the number of handguns per capita, much higher in Plano than Chicago, do not correspond so directly to the homicide rate. More homicides occur where youth are idle, frustrated, and unemployed.
Continue reading →